A Note on the Badiou View of Decision and the Undecidable

In his Larval Subjects post of February 20, 2014, “Let’s Talk About Sets!,” Levi Bryant presents, in apparent agreement, the view of Alain Badiou that:

Nothing prevents a decision with respect to what’s undecidable (and notice how closely he parallels Derrida in The Politics of Friendship here!).

It seems to me evident that, on the contrary, something does prevent a decision with respect to what’s undecidable. That is the, let me be unguarded here, truth or indeed tautological necessity that:

Only the decidable can be decided.

That is:

The undecidable cannot be decided.

It seems to me further the that precisely analogous propositions bearing on, say, the thought and the thinkable, the named and the namable, and the discerned and the discernible, are equally truths or tautological necessities, as is the proposition covering all such cases of determination:

Only the determinable can be determined.

That is:

The undeterminable cannot be determined.

About Rchard E. Hennessey

See above, "About the Author/Editor."
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