The aim of After Aristotle is that of promoting and engaging in serious philosophical discussion from the point of view of a Neo-Aristotelian philosophical perspective. This philosophical perspective is one that, as suggested by the blog title, is in some central theses and theories very much in line with that or those of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. As suggested, however, by the “Neo-Aristotelian” of the blog’s tagline, in other theses and theories it departs from that or those of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, and significantly.

Among the ways in which the philosophical perspective motivating After Aristotle is very much in line with that or those of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition is that it, like they, sees the recognition of theses such as the following as central to any genuine understanding of the real:

The General Principle of Realism: There exists a genuine multiplicity of beings subject to change and varying in magnitude and nature.

The “First Principles” of Philosophical Rationalism:

The Principle of Non-Contradiction: No being can both be and not be, in any one respect and at any one time.

The Principle of Excluded Middle: All beings must either be or not be, in any one respect and at any one time.

(I include “First Principles” within quotes because I plan, at some point in the future, to have some more to say on the matter of which principles are “first principles” and on that of in what way they are “first.”)

Moreover, the thesis that we are capable of the genuine understanding of the real adverted to above, that is, of the sort of understanding represented by the principles just given, is basic to the perspective of After Aristotle; I’ll spell it out as the:

Thesis of Epistemism: There exists a genuine knowledge, indeed a science, of the real.

The ways in which the philosophical perspective motivating After Aristotle departs from that or those of Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, and significantly, will become clear as the posts make their way to the page. For the time being, I’ll let the following two definitions serve as indicators:

(x)(y)(2xy ↔ ~Ixy)

(x)(y)(z)(3xyz ↔ (~Ixy & ~Iyz & ~I xz))

In English:

For any existent x and any existent y, x and y are two existents if and only if x and y are not identical.

For any existent x, any existent y, and any existent z, x, y, and z are three existents if and only if x and y are not identical, y and z are not identical, and x and z are not identical.

I pledge to offer, at some point in the future, the reasons I have for holding that definitions such as these are among the foundations of a theory of arithmetic which is both of a far greater theoretical power than that of Aristotle and far more consonant with the theses of a truly Aristotelian arithmetical theory than that or those of Aristotle himself or the Aristotelian tradition. For now I’ll content myself with the observation that (a) they are true and (b) at least some of us know that they are true.

Let me close by stating that the neo-Aristotelian perspective that I, with a no doubt singular lack of modesty, aspire to present in After Aristotle is the perspective which I like to believe the Stagirite himself would be advancing were he alive today and benefitting from having studied, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, William of Ockham, and Gottlob Frege, as he would have studied them.